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Statutes and the Common Law of Contracts: A
Shared Methodology
Juliet P Kostritsky

I. Introduction
This chapter explores the intersection between, or the impact of, statutes on contract law, and
compares the relative importance of, and intersections between, statutory and common law in contract.
Unquestionably, statutes have increased in importance; ‘we live in a statutory era’. 1 Those who highlight
the rise of statutory intervention in contract often argue that legislative regulation has largely displaced
the common law of contracts 2 and that there is little left to the core of contract law. 3
To judge the meaning of these statutory developments for contract law, one must situate them
in context. That context must include not only an understanding of statutes and their institutional role in
society, 4 but also the role of courts in developing common law rules 5 – and the particular way in which
statutes and the common law operate within bargained-for contractual exchange. Traditionally, scholars
viewed statutes as intrusions into private ordering requiring justification 6 while regarding the common

See D Farber and PP Frickey, ‘In the Shadow of the Legislature: The Common Law in the Age of New Public Law’
(1991) 89 Michigan Law Review 875, 876. See generally G Calabresi, A Common Law For the Age of Statutes
(Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1999).

1

See eg, EJ Leib, ‘What is the Relational Theory of Consumer Form Contract?’ in J Braucher, J Kidwell and W
Whitford (eds) Revisiting the Contracts Scholarship of Stewart Macaulay (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2013) 259, 262
(discussing displacement of contract law in consumer context).

2

See D Kennedy, ‘Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication’ (1985) 89 Harvard Law Review 1685, 1737
(discussing the concept of core and periphery in which the core of contract law is deemed to be private and the
public, regulatory aspects of contract law are marginalised at the periphery).

3

Scholars of statutory law see problems with legislatures being dominated by ‘special interest groups’ due to
collective action problems that ‘make it difficult to organize large groups of individuals to seek broadly dispersed
public goods’. Farber and Frickey, ‘In the Shadow of the Legislature’ (1991) 880.

4

ibid (finding that there is still a viable role for courts despite legislative onslaught because the types of interest
group lobbying to solve narrow problems still leaves room for courts to provide remedies when the statutory
scheme fails to address a problem). They warn ‘against reading negative implications into the precise contours of
the complicated statutory scheme’. ibid 898.

5

6

ibid 875.

39

law of tort, property and contract as embodying an ‘autonomous private order’. 7 However, recognising
that both private law (through common law) and public law (through statutes) intervene in private
contractual arrangements by adding or forbidding terms may change the traditional dichotomous view.
The particular intervention, as well as the effects of, and justification for, intervention by courts or the
legislature into private contracts should be analysed. Intervention must be built on realistic assumptions
about how parties behave and react to common law rules and statutes 8 as well as an assessment of how
such legal interventions will serve parties’ private goals, or more broadly public ones – thus bringing
social context into contract law. A comparative approach should also ask: why does intervention follow
one course rather than another? What approach will best improve goal achievement after accounting
for the costs of intervention?
When is a statutory or common law intervention welfare-enhancing as compared to goal
achievement without intervention? 9 The assessment of intervention by these various ‘institutions’ 10
must be made on a comparative basis. 11 How much, and in what circumstances, should legislatures
intervene? When is the legislature better or worse than common law courts in intervening, and why?
At one level, because contracts are devised in societies governed by statutes, the parties to
those contracts must be subject to those laws. A key question, as yet undertheorised, is why and when
7

ibid 885–86. Property, tort and contract operated fundamentally to protect private rights.

The examination of the influence of statutes on contract law necessarily differs from examining the effects of
statutes on tort law in one important respect – statutes affecting contract law must consider that parties have the
ability to craft agreements ex ante in a way that tort actors do not. For a thoughtful exploration of the effects of
statutes on tort law, see TT Arvind and J Steel, ‘Introduction: Legislation and the Scope of Tort Law’ in TT Arvind
and J Steele (eds), Tort Law and the Legislature (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2013). That difference affects intervention
choices by the legislature. For a discussion of the realistic behavioral assumptions affecting transacting parties see
OE Williamson, Economic Institutions of Capitalism (New York, The Free Press, 1985) 44–50.

8

Assessing welfare enhancement must include a comparative assessment of whether intervention by a legislature
or court will help the parties achieve their desired goals without introducing costs that reduce the overall net
benefits when compared to non-intervention. As Professor Coffey explains: ‘the intervention must promise a netof-cognizable-intervention-costs improvement of goal achievement (as compared to the level of desired effect
reached without intervention)’. RJ Coffey, ‘Methodological Perspective’ (2002) 6 A manuscript by my colleague.
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
9

If broadly defined, courts, private exchanges and statutes are institutions. ‘Institutions define and limit the set of
choices of individuals.’ DC North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance 4, 2nd edn
(Cambridge University Press. USA1990). ‘Institutions include any form of constraint that human beings devise to
shape human interaction.’ ibid. These institutions also extend to private organisations like the New York Stock
Exchange, which establishes rules to govern the voluntary arrangements of participants who join. See, eg, the NYSE
Rules, at http://wallstreet.cch.com/nyse/rules (2019).
10

See O Williamson, Mechanisms of Governance (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1996) 7 (discussing
remediableness ‘according to which an outcome for which no superior alternative can be described with net gains
is presumed to be efficient’); N Komesar, ‘In Search of a General Approach to Legal Analysis: A Comparative
Institutional Alternative’ (1980) 79 Michigan Law Review 1350, 1350 (examining different decision-makers and
evaluating them according to a criterion of ‘choosing the best, or least imperfect, institution to implement a given
societal goal’). In this chapter, a comparative analysis also assesses legal intervention against leaving the solution
to parties’ private strategies.

11
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statutes or common law rules would be needed to govern, supplement or forbid parties’ private
arrangements, and whether statutes and the common law share a common methodology. Examining
statutes and moving beyond a merely case-centric view of contracts prompts a new insight: not only do
statutes influence the common law of contracts, but also that statutes and common law interventions in
contracts are driven by the same taxonomy – a shared methodology – of intervening to add terms when
obstacles prevent the parties from reaching a complete contract, the costs of intervention do not
outweigh the benefits, and such intervention will improve welfare. 12
Courts intervene in contracts in many ways: they may add trade usages or default rules of
remedies or fiduciary duties to an agreement, forbid certain contractual waivers (as in the implied
warranty of habitability 13), or withhold enforcement. 14 Statutes also intervene in private contracts by
providing background default rules; other statutes regulate contracts by mandating certain disclosure or
forbidding certain contracts.
This chapter treats statutory and judicial interventions – through the common law of rule
formulation and extension – as different forms of collective intervention into private contracts. In the
financial contracting literature, 15 intervention refers to cases in which courts or legislatures take actions
that add or subtract terms from parties’ contracts or refuse to enforce private contracts, 16 rather than
letting the market operate without any interference.
With either legislative or common law intervention in contracts, 17 the goals of the contracting
parties provide the foundation for analysis. In any exchange, parties seek to maximise surplus while
minimising costs. Contract law ‘allow[s] parties to act in a manner consistent with their voluntary
preferences’. 18 Thus, intervention, whether by common law courts or the legislature, should depend on

See JS Wiley, Jr, ‘A Capture Theory of Antitrust Federalism’ (1986) 99 Harvard Law Review 713, 749 fn 167 (cited
in TJ Zywicki, ‘A Unanimity-Reinforcing Model of Efficiency in the Common Law: An Institutional Comparison of
Common Law and Legislative Solutions to Large-Number Externality Problems’ (1996) 46 Case Western Reserve
Law Review 961, 966 fn 17) (explaining Pareto efficiency as holding ‘one condition to be superior to another only if
at least one person is better off and no one is worse off’).

12

WZ Hirsch, JG Hirsch and S Margolis, ‘Regression Analysis of the Effects of Habitability Laws Upon Rent: An
Empirical Observation of the Ackerman-Komesar Debate’ (1975) 63 California Law Review 1098.

13

14

See part IX below (discussing denying enforcement to contracts with forbidden terms).

The intervention question – whether courts or legislatures should intervene in parties’ private contracts – arises
in the context of securities laws. Scholars analyse whether securities laws will enhance efficiency and improve
welfare. See FH Easterbrook and DR Fischel, ‘Mandatory Disclosure and the Protection of Investors’ (1984) 70
Virginia Law Review 669.

15

16

See UCC § 2-302.

For an example of the scholarly recognition of the importance of statutes in contracts, see generally Q Zhou and
L DiMatteo, ‘Three Sales Laws and the Common law of Contracts’ in Comparative Contract Law: British and
American Perspective (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2015).

17

PM Gerhart, JP Kostritsky and RJ Coffey, ‘The Birth of an Interventional Choice – A Justificational Analysis’
(summer 2005) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).

18
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whether the parties can achieve and maximise welfare on their own, or whether transaction costs or
other bargaining obstacles prevent that. Could the parties achieve their goals through pure contract
without needing to resort to governmental enforcement or other collective interventions –
interventions that entail costs? How can governmental intervention, either in the form of a common law
rule or statute, or some combination of statute and common law, 19 facilitate contracting and help the
parties achieve goals that they could not achieve on their own? Finally, when should common law courts
or legislatures forbid or mandate certain terms in a contract or otherwise intervene in private contracts?
To assess the welfare effects of certain interventions, courts and legislatures should use
empirical studies to evaluate whether ‘a particular set of institutional terms may reduce [costs] (by
comparison to one or more possible term sets) without introducing new costs that offset or exceed the
costs introduced’; 20 that comparison will determine if one intervention is superior to another by
achieving articulated goals more efficiently. 21 Constant readjustment of intervention and comparison
may be needed to avoid ‘unintended consequences’ 22 that add costs to contracts without solving
problems.
This chapter in part II considers differences and similarities between legislatures and courts. Part
III examines private ordering that successfully navigates problems between two parties without any
collective intervention. Parts IV and V use that baseline to explain why and when a court or a legislature
would intervene in a private arrangement. Part IV describes when legislatures and courts might add
norms or trade usages of private parties to the parties’ contract – a form of intervention by adding nonadjudicable norms 23 to an express contract through an incorporation strategy – and part V discusses
when and why legislatures and courts might add remedial default rules. Part VI examines how legislative
intervention may be required to achieve goals parties cannot accomplish on their own by contract. Part
VII discusses when statutes and common law rules facilitate contracting by minimising transaction costs
and maximising value. Part VIII examines when intervention should take the form of mandated
disclosure and who should develop the parameters for such disclosures. When are mandated
disclosures effective and when does mandated disclosure fail as a solution to informational asymmetries
and other contracting problems? Part IX examines what effect, if any, legislative prohibitions have on
the common law of contracts. If legislatures forbid the inclusion of certain terms in contracts, when and

Federal Rule 10b-5 is a legislative anti-fraud provision, but the content of insider trading rules derives largely
from common law cases on duty. See JC Coffee, Jr, ‘Mapping the Future of Insider Trading Law: Of Boundaries,
Gaps and Strategies’ [2013] ECGI Working Paper Series in Law 204, 4.

19

Email from Ronald J Coffey, Professor Emeritus, Case Western Reserve University, to Professor Juliet P
Kostritsky, Case Western Reserve University (1 June 2013, on file with author).

20

Because achievement of one goal may hinder achievement of another goal, intervenors – whether legislatures
or courts – need to confront the concept of covariance, asking ‘how much of one must be foregone to capture a
measure of the other.’ Coffey (n 9).

21

See O Ben-Shahar and CE Schneider, ‘The Failure of Mandated Disclosure’ (2011) 159 University of Pennsylvania
Law Review 647, 647.

22

See, eg, J Kraus, ‘Legal Design and the Evolution of Commercial Norms’ (1997) 26 Journal of Legal Studies377; RE
Scott, ‘The Limits of Behavioral Theories of Law and Social Norms’ (2000) 86 Virginia Law Review 1603.

23
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why do parties contract around legislative provisions to achieve their private goals? 24 What do all of
these interventions and their effects suggest about any limits on governmental interventions as well as
the need to constantly reevaluate the effectiveness of interventions using a method that examines all
costs and benefits?
By providing a justificatory framework for intervention tied to bargaining obstacles, 25 the
success of private ordering in certain contexts, and a method of comparing costs and benefits of
intervention by different institutions, one can assess whether and why certain interventions are
effective, and why others fail. These insights can guide future interveners – whether legislatures or
courts – in private contracts.

II. Courts and Legislatures: Differences and Similarities
To fully understand why and how statutes passed by legislatures and rules developed by courts
intervene in parties’ contracts, the general role that statutes and common law courts play deserves
scrutiny. Courts and legislatures operate in different realms; courts only address disputes that are
brought to them by one of the parties whereas legislatures can proactively identify a problem without
having to wait for a party to initiate the process, gathering information before drafting statutes to
address those problems. 26 Statutes state general rules applicable to a wide class of parties; 27 courts’
decisions are narrowly targeted to the parties’ dispute. 28
While institutional differences certainly exist between courts and legislatures, 29 at a
fundamental level there is a commonality in the decision to enact a statute or to develop a common law
rule in the context of a particular case. When common law courts decide cases and interpret precedent,
or create an exception to prior precedent, they inevitably do more than decide the controversy ex post.

See, eg, S Sanga, ‘Incomplete Contracts: An Empirical Approach’ (2018) 34 Journal of Law, Economics, &
Organization 650.

24

JP Kostritsky, ‘Taxonomy for Justifying Legal Intervention in An Imperfect World: What to Do When Parties Have
Not Achieved Bargains Or Have Drafted Incomplete Contracts’ [2004] Wisconsin Law Review 323.

25

See L Anderlini, L Felli and A Riboni, ‘Statute Law or Case Law’ (1 July 2008), available at
https://ssrn.com/abstract=1168662; Farber and Frickey (n 1). See also RA Posner, Economic Analysis of Law, 7th ed
(New York, Wolters Kluwer, 2007) § 19.3 (discussing legislative considerations, and inefficiencies, in lawmaking).

26

For that reason, statutes can appropriately act when there are large groups of homogeneous parties that would
be subject to a rule and flexibility is not required. See I Ehrlich and RA Posner, ‘An Economic Analysis of Legal
Rulemaking’ (1974) 3 Journal of Legal Studies 257 (discussing ‘a relatively broad span of activity’ characteristic of
legislation).

27

28

See Calabresi, A Common Law (1999).

Email from Professor Peter M Gerhart, Case Western Reserve University to Professor Juliet P Kostritsky, Case
Western Reserve University (5 July 2018, on file with author).

29
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This is because prior case law necessarily ‘underdetermines’ 30 the outcome of subsequent cases. In
making decisions about the parameters of the holding of a prior case that differs from the current case,
a court must resort to a normative framework. That is why ‘economic theory treats common law
adjudication, especially of hard cases, as the effective equivalent of legislating new legal rules’. 31
If courts use a framework that references goals and a model of behaviour of the parties, then
judicial decision-making resembles legislation. Although cases are decided ex post after events have
occurred 32 a court deciding a case must reference how the decision – including particular rule
formulations or implied terms – will promote parties’ private goals, including welfare maximisation.
Legislatures passing statutes that affect private contracts will also consider how the legislation will affect
the goals of future parties deciding to enter contracts. If a legislature considers social goals, it should
also consider the effects on private parties. That will enable it to determine if the overall benefits of
addressing those externalities 33 outweigh the costs of intervention.

III. Private Ordering without Intervention or Contracting
Because the protection of private contracts is essential, in judging the justification for, and effects of,
statutory and judicial intervention, one should first consider the realm of private transacting where
parties resolve matters between themselves rather than adopt an explicitly enforceable contract. If
parties reach an accommodation on their own completely outside of contract, legal intervention,
whether judicial or legislative, would be superfluous.
Understanding the commonalities in the rule-making of courts and legislatures that add terms to
contracts may be easier if one examines how parties reach an exchange resolution without an
adjudicator of any kind being involved, and devise informal constraints. Parties could later devise
contracts to address the same controversy and invoke third-party enforcement.
In general, parties will try to achieve their goals while minimising the costs of doing so. 34 If there
are no barriers to the parties reaching an exchange and they do not do so, there would presumably be
R Craswell, ‘Do Trade Customs Exist’ in JS Kraus and SD Walt (eds), The Jurisprudential Foundations of Corporate
and Commercial Law (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2000); JS Kraus and SD Walt, ‘In Defense of the
Incorporation Strategy’ in Kraus and Walt (eds), Jurisprudential Foundations (ibid) at 122.

30

J Kraus, ‘The Methodological Commitments of Contemporary Contract Theory’ in JL Coleman and S Shapiro
(eds), The Oxford Handbook On Jurisprudence And Legal Theory (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2002). A narrow
view of judicial decision-making might argue to the contrary that ‘every pronouncement of legal decisionmakers is
so nuanced by factual peculiarities that it cannot be interpreted as based on value selection’. Coffey,
Methodological Perspective (n 9) at 4.
31

That difference of courts addressing issues ex post leads courts to address issues ‘myopically.’ See Anderlini et
al, ‘Statute Law’ (2008) 1.

32

See AC Pigou, The Economics of Welfare, 4th edn (London, Macmillan, 1932) 192 (discussing the link between
externalities and legislative intervention) (cited in Zywicki, ‘A Unanimity-Reinforcing Model’ (1996) 961).

33

34

Gerhart, Kostritsky and Coffey, ‘The Birth of an Interventional Choice’ (2005).

39

little welfare justification for legal intervention. The absence of a contract would reflect the parties’
determination that no welfare improvements could be gained from an exchange. An example follows.
Imagine two next-door neighbors, one playing loud music and the other objecting to it. 35 Each
party knows who the other is and can identify the source of the noise. Not knowing exactly how the law
would address the problem were they to complain, they might reach a resolution: one party – the noise
objector – might take out the noisemaker’s garbage, hoping the noisemaker turns down the volume.
Alternatively, the noisemaker could take out the garbage of the noise objector to deter complaints.
Either resolution would comprise a private arrangement that internalises the externality of the loud
music – a kind of implicit contract or private strategy. 36 Alternately, the parties could adjust their
behaviour by conforming to a norm. 37 In these cases, there is no need for any judicial or statutory
intervention. When there are no obvious barriers to a private agreement, a court is unlikely to intervene
with implied terms. Likewise, a legislature is unlikely to intervene to regulate the controversy. There are
no market imperfections and no gains from trade.

IV. Non-adjudicable Norm Omitted from Express Contract: Should Law
Add a Term?
The noise controversy example illustrates how parties reach private solutions. They could have but did
not reach a contractual solution; instead, they selected another institution – a non-adjudicable private
strategy. Numerous other examples of private arrangements operating without collective governmental
intervention in contract or exchange exist. For example, the Maghribi traders successfully developed a
norm that constrained the behaviour of agents and also developed private mechanisms for enforcement
where state power was undeveloped. 38 Another norm might standardise weights and measures to
‘minimise … measurement costs in markets’. 39 In the example of the neighbors with the noise problem
(outlined above), a private contractual practice with respect to neighbors’ modulation of the music
volume and trash collection could become prevalent as a general norm for noise controversies (in the
community).

35

ibid.

Implicit contracts can exist between employers and employees and these implicit arrangements deal with
unexpected changes (such as slackening demand). Because third-party observers ‘are not sufficiently informed’
and explicit contracts will not be achievable, parties will rely on implicit contracts that are self-enforcing due to
self-interest. C Azariadis, ‘Implicit Contracts’ in J Eatwell, M Milgate and P Newman (eds), Allocation Information
and Markets (Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 1982). See also C Bull, ‘The Existence of Self-Enforcing Implicit
Contracts’ (1987) 102 Quarterly Journal of Economics 147.
36

37

Gerhart, Kostritsky and Coffey (n 18).

See A Greif, Institutions and the Path to the Modern Economy Lessons from Medieval Trade (Cambridge,
Cambridge University Press, 2006) 59–63.

38

RE Zupko, Revolution in Measurement: Western European Weights and Measures in the Age of Science
(Philadelphia, American Philosophical Society, 1990) 183–84.

39
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How norms become incorporated into law as additional terms of a contract through common
law default rules 40 or through statues 41 should be analysed under a common methodology. The decision
to add terms or to intervene should depend on a cost comparison of a self-enforcing norm and ‘the
costs of alternative arrangements – such as common law, statute, and the particular advantage and
disadvantage of each solution in such contracts’. 42
When norms develop, intervention by either courts or a legislature might arise as an issue if
parties fail to adhere to a norm. Those aware of a ‘propensity to diverge’ 43 might include the norm as an
express term of their contract. But if the parties fail to include the norm or practice in their contract, a
court or a legislature faces the issue of whether to intervene by incorporating the norm as a term in the
contract. A court or legislature might decide that the best practice would be one of non-interference
through legal recognition of the norm. They use the norm as an input 44 or source for the legal
intervention. The Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) adopts such an incorporation strategy by making
trade usages, course of performance and course of dealing automatically part of the parties’
agreement. 45 Courts also incorporate trade usages into parties’ contracts, often to control opportunistic
behaviour. 46
If a court or the legislature adverts to the goals of the contracting parties in deciding whether
intervention to add norms to a contract would improve welfare, it could recognise such norms to save
the parties the transaction costs of expressly incorporating them. That strategy might be costminimising when the parties use customary language, not realising that they would need to translate
those customary meanings into express terms in order for the express terms to include their customary
meanings. 47 The transaction costs thus include not just drafting but even the costs of conceptualising
that there is a need to draft. 48

40

See JP Kostritsky, ‘The Law and Economics of Norms’ (2013) 48 Texas International Law Journal 465, 497.

41

See UCC § 2-202.

42

Kostritsky, ‘Norms’ (2013) 483.

Email from Ronald J Coffey, Professor Emeritus, Case Western Reserve University, to Juliet P Kostritsky, Case
Western Reserve University (2 May 1996, on file with author).

43

44

Kostritsky (n 40) 485.

UCC § 2-201(b)(3). UCC § 2-202 provides that unless the parties explicitly negate them, the parties’ private
norms and trade usages can be used to explain or supplement parties’ private contracts.
45

See JP Kostritsky, ‘Judicial Incorporation of Trade Usages: A Functional Solution to the Opportunism Problem’
(2006) 39 Connecticut Law Review 451.

46

47

Kraus and Walt (n 30) 199 (discussing increased specification costs). See also Kostritsky (n 40) 498.

Kraus and Walt (n 30) 199. See also JP Kostritsky, ‘Contract Interpretation: Judicial Rule Not Party Choice’ in
Larry DiMatteo Qi Zhou, Severine Saintier, and Keith Rowley (eds), Commercial Contract Law: A Transatlantic
Perspective (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2013) 258 fn 92. There is an accent over the e in Severine JK
48
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A court or legislature deciding whether to add norms to a contract and then to enforce such an
augmented contract should consider whether the parties have already reached implicit or nonadjudicable norms or practices that are effectively self-enforcing. If not, would legal recognition and
enforcement of a norm enhance value for both parties by saving on specification costs 49 or by curbing
the prospect of opportunistic behaviour? Non-adjudicable norms might be self-enforcing, or might
depend on enforcement by third-party organisations. Conventions such as driving on the right side of
the road would be self-enforcing, whereas informal norms dealing with measurement of weights in
merchant trade might develop privately and then depend on additional third-party sanctions.
The incorporation decision, whether in the form of a statutory or judicial decision to incorporate
the norm, should depend on the common methodology – the justificatory framework for assessing all
interventions in private exchanges. Does the legal formalisation adopting the content of the eligible
input of a norm or the legal enforcement of a norm (two separate questions) save parties’ costs and
increase surplus?
A court or legislature might decide not to intervene to incorporate the norm as a term of the
contract if it viewed the norm as an implicit understanding that the parties intended to enforce solely
through private means of enforcement. 50 A legislature or court might also decline to enforce the norm if
the lawmaker concluded that the parties would want the flexibility to depart from following the norm to
respond to circumstances – opting to not be bound to a past practice. 51 The court or legislature would
be more likely to decline to adopt the norm if it believed the parties could bargain or rebargain once the
issue had surfaced. 52 Finally, if parties are better able to judge whether the norm should apply, 53 a court
or legislature might decline to adopt the norm.
If, however, the court or the legislature decides that norms save parties costs by policing
opportunism that would otherwise act as a drag on gains from trade, a court or legislature might decide
to incorporate the norm into private contracts. In that way, intervention might help parties achieve
more of what they wanted ex ante by policing a behaviour – opportunism – that would otherwise
decrease gains from trade. 54 Intervention would therefore be welfare-enhancing. The legal decisionmaker in deciding whether to incorporate the private norm into the contract – either by a statute or

49

Kraus and Walt (n 30) 193.

These include threats of reputational or other enforcement mechanisms such as a collective boycott. Greif,
Institutions (2006).

50

51

See Kraus and Walt (n 30) 208.

See A Schwartz and J Watson, ‘The Law and Economics of Costly Contracting’ (2004) 20 Journal of Law,
Economics, & Organization 2 (examining party preferences on whether renegotiation should be restricted).

52

53

Kraus and Walt (n 30) 208.

See Williamson, ‘Economic Institutions’ (1985) 33–36 (connecting need to minimise opportunism to increased
gains from trade).

54
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common law rule – will consider the deadweight losses from uncontrolled opportunism as well as
potential mistakes by decision-makers in understanding the norm. 55
Legal recognition of private norms – a type of intervention – should thus depend in part on
whether the adopting lawmaker thinks that, as a general matter, courts or legislatures would be able to
facilitate the achievement of the parties’ goals by aptly discerning norms, in effect deferring to the
parties’ express arrangements, 56 or declining to enforce such norms unless the parties expressly
incorporated them. 57 Norm incorporation may also depend on whether a court or legislature thinks that
legally enforcing or recognising a norm will crowd out or complement private enforcement strategies
parties have, because crowding out would be considered a cost of intervention. 58
This structured methodology for explaining why courts might intervene by adding terms such as
norms to private contracts based on the barriers to contracting can also explain instances in which
statutory interventions add to the parties’ terms through default rules, such as the UCC Article 2 default
rules or statutory or common law fiduciary duty rules. These statutes or common law rules can be
justified as assisting the parties in achieving their private goals by helping them overcome costs or
obstacles that private counterstrategies could not solve or when such strategies would be more costly
than a law-supplied rule. 59 It can also explain why remedial default rules exist. 60

V. Private Agreements Formed without Statutes: Government
Intervention to Enforce or Add Remedial Defaults
When barriers to contracting do not exist, parties can form a business association by deliberately
entering into an enforceable contract. There is no need for a statute – a collective intervention – telling
the parties how to split the profits. However, unless the parties could depend solely on informal
55

See Kraus and Walt (n 30) 194 (discussing the problem of errors in incorporation strategy).

See DV Snyder, ‘Language and Formalities in Commercial Contracts: A Defense of Custom and Conduct’ (2001)
54 SMU Law Review 617, 618 (‘Custom ... is part of the language that parties use to express themselves to each
other’).

56

This approach would run counter to § 2-202, which assumes that norms (trade usages, etc) will be incorporated
unless specifically negated. See UCC § 2-202 cmt 2.
57

See JP Kostritsky, ‘A Bargaining Dynamic Transaction Cost Approach to Understanding Framework Contracts’
(2019) 68 American University Law Review 1621, 1693 (discussing crowding out). If the law crowds out private or
self-enforcement, legal intervention could add to the costs of goal achievement. There are reasons to think that
crowding out concerns are exaggerated or misplaced.

58

Coffey, email (n 43). See also RJ Coffey, ‘This is the Way I Would Set Up the Intractability Analysis’ (unpublished
manuscript, on file with author).

59

For default rules to persist, they must ‘solve a problem that a reasonable portion of contractors will face in a
way that is acceptable to those contractors.’ A Schwartz, ‘The Default Rule Paradigm and the Limits of Contract
Law’ (1993) 3 Southern California Interdisciplinary Law Journal 389, 392. This ‘acceptability constraint’ (ibid) is
consistent with the common methodology described in this chapter – legal intervention is justified only when the
benefits of the intervention outweigh any offsetting costs of intervention (or inaction).

60
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reputational sanctions, they might need to resort to a court to enforce the partnership. If the court
decided to enforce the contract by awarding damages, it would be adding a remedial default rule – a
form of collective intervention.
Professor Whitford has recently suggested that eliminating all default rule contractual remedies
would cause parties to be reluctant to contract at all, or they might ‘demand a larger risk premium’. 61
Therefore, courts may decide that intervening in private contracts by adding a remedial default rule is
justified because ‘it is hard to believe the benefits of eliminating the availability of remedies as a default
remedy would exceed its costs’. 62 This intervention is consistent with the welfare-maximising common
methodology articulated here.
The justification for supplying a remedial default rule is that it will minimise costs for the parties
– the same justification that underlies other decisions by courts or legislatures to add other terms to
parties’ contracts. A remedial default rule saves parties the costs that they would otherwise incur if they
had to charge a premium to make up for the absence of such defaults without creating new offsetting
costs that outweigh the costs saved.
The British courts’ decision at common law to adopt expectation damages as a default rule,
adding to every contract damages calculated on the position that the party would have been in had the
contract been performed, 63 is based on the parties’ bargain. One recent argument explained that the
success of remedial default rules is because they are ‘formulas [that] are transcontextual because they
are content free’. 64 The fact that the remedial default takes the form of a ‘transcontextual’ formula that
is tied to the parties’ own deal and is easily applied satisfies the cost analysis, but is not a reason for its
adoption as a default rule. Courts could have declined to adopt a remedial default rule at all, forcing
parties to stipulate to damages in every contract. Courts could have adopted an altogether different
remedial default rule such as punitive damages. That courts adopted a default rule of expectation
damages and used a formula to achieve that goal evidences that courts wanted to avoid the costs of
parties needing to charge a premium for the absence of default rules. It wanted a rule that, because of
the formula, would not impose offsetting costs that outweighed the benefits and would not lead to
costly inefficiencies of a contrary rule, such as punitive damages. 65
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A further question with remedial default rules for damages is whether the default rule should be
added by a legislative rule or a judicially developed default rule. Default rule remedial issues arise when
the parties have already reached a bargain. There is thus no need for the legislature to intervene to
solve an externality problem that the parties cannot solve by contract. Should the legislature
nonetheless have a role in designing remedial default rules? Would that intervention be better than a
judicially supplied default rule? Damage default rules might best be developed by courts when no
externalities are present, the cost of not supplying a remedy is welfare-reducing, and courts can slowly
develop the contours of the remedial default scheme including the role of mitigation, uncertainty and
foreseeability, and the theories of damages informed by scholarship of great contracts scholars such as
Fuller and Purdue. 66 Bright line rules for some aspects of remedies seem inappropriate, so incremental
consideration through case law would have a comparative advantage. However, once a remedial
scheme is fully developed by courts, a legislature might enact a remedial default scheme for a particular
context, such as the sale of goods. 67

VI. Statutes Intervening to Help Parties Achieve Goals they could not
Achieve Privately
The inability to bargain to a solution affects the decision and the manner in which the legislature
intervenes. A statute may solve a problem that parties could not solve by private agreement, or could
not solve because of budget constraints. If the parties are unknown, bargains cannot be negotiated.
Several examples illustrate the advantage of legislative intervention to solve contracting problems: first,
to regulate dog owners, second, to provide unlimited liability for corporations and third, to enact
bankruptcy statutes. When an exchange cannot be achieved at all, relying on the common law of
contracts with its commitment to enforcing private agreements will not work. Legislatures seem
uniquely situated to intervene and have advantages over intervention by a court because, without a
contract being formed, the role a court could play would be a null set. Thus, the inability to reach an
agreement by contracting may justify legislative intervention by regulation if the common methodology
indicates that intervention will increase overall welfare when the benefits outweigh the offsetting costs.
In other instances, where the contract is achieved but incomplete, the legislature may add a term.

A. Solving Externalities
Collective intervention by legislatures responds to difficulties that parties face solving a problem by
contract. A private contractual resolution may not occur when the parties do not directly interact.
Private norms or private contracting might fail to solve externality problems, as when dog owners fail to
Law Journal 629 (arguing that punitives are more efficient because costs of forcing the breaching party to
negotiate for a liability release are lower than costs of litigation of establishing expectancy damages).
LL Fuller and W Purdue, ‘The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages’ (1936–37) 46 Yale Law Journal 52
(examining protection of the reliance interest as a separate element of damages).
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clean up after their dogs. 68 Yet, a contract between the offending dog owners and the homeowner
victims would likely be difficult to achieve. 69 Without extraordinary search costs, the homeowner could
not know which dog owner had failed to supervise their dog. The law might intervene and pass a statute
requiring owners to pick up dog litter or face sanctions. Statutory intervention would respond to the
difficulty of the parties reaching a bargain on their own. 70 The passage of such a law might in turn
facilitate public norms, 71 demonstrating a successful interplay of different institutions, both public and
private, to solve problems.
The comparison for intervention should consider several costs. First, there are transactions costs
(as the cost of reaching bargains with pet owners regarding negative externalities of pet activity). There
is also the cost of legal intervention and the associated cost of legal enforcement. However, that latter
cost may be mitigated by a norm that arises to report violators once the law is passed. So there are
contracting costs, the costs of judicial action in trespass (as an alternative institutional solution), and the
cost of legal intervention as reduced by informal norm enforcement. A comparison suggests that legal
intervention in the form of a ‘pooper scooper’ law is the most effective solution to an externality
problem as the transaction costs of private agreements are high, judicial intervention in contracts is a
null set (because they don’t exist) and the legislature can intervene with a bright line rule. 72

B. Legislation when Parties cannot Solve: Limited Liability
A statutory intervention to solve contracting difficulties also explains why legislatures intervene with a
statute granting corporations limited liability. 73 If two parties come together to form a business entity
for the first time, those parties are entitled to be held liable only to the extent of their capital

See DH Cole and PZ Grossman (eds), Principles of Law and Economics (New York, Wolters Kluwer, 2011) 18
(defining externalities in which ‘some of the costs or benefits associated with the transactions are not borne by
those participating in the transaction but externalized to others’).
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This statutory intervention could also spark informal enforcement by members of the public who would feel
empowered to informally sanction dog owners who violated the law.
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This example illustrates how the common methodology of this chapter guides which lawmaker should intervene,
not merely whether intervention is appropriate. Though statutes have been considered the proper mode of legal
intervention to solve large-number externality problems, scholars have called into question this ‘conventional
wisdom’: Zywicki (n 12) 961. Legislatures are prone to ‘overrepresenting third parties not directly involved with the
issue at hand,’ ibid 983, which ‘Separat[es] influence over results from the costs of those results’: ibid 986. By
contrast, when a judge is the legal decision-maker to resolve a large-number externality problem, ‘The judge can
internalize the effects of a decision in a manner that the legislator, acting as a representative of a large voting
block, cannot’: ibid 989. By considering whether the common law would be more efficient at solving a contract law
problem than a statute, the common methodology of this chapter is thus illustrative.
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contributions as against third parties. 74 Shareholders are not liable for a firm’s debts or torts. Why
would the law intervene and protect the initial shareholders by adding a limited liability term to their
contract? Why couldn’t the shareholders bargain for that limited liability as against third parties? Why
couldn’t the common law imply a term in the shareholders’ contract with the firm? Normally, common
law courts supply terms under majoritarian default rules on the theory that both parties would have
preferred that term. 75 However, majoritarian preferences depend on weighing an exchange between
two contracting parties; it would not ordinarily include a term binding unrelated or unknown third
parties. Thus, a legislative response would be the only response to solve the problem.
The justification for intervention is that the initial parties simply cannot achieve limited liability
by private contract in such a way as to bind third parties. The law decides that the benefits of
intervention in the form of a limited liability addition to their contract incentivise parties to invest, and
that those benefits outweigh any negative externalities. Limited liability thus serves to ‘externalize some
portion of the business’ total risk exposure to creditors’. 76

C. Legislation to Solve a Timing Problem Hindering Contracts: Bankruptcy
Another way in which the law can respond to bargaining obstacles that parties cannot resolve privately
is by solving ‘time-inconsistency problem[s]’ through enactment of bankruptcy statutes. 77 Beginning in
England in 1581, 78 the law decided to subject creditor–borrower contracts to the rules of bankruptcy. In
one sense, the intervention is simply part of the not unremarkable ‘general common law rule that courts
in construing contracts shall incorporate relevant, unmentioned laws as implied contract terms’. 79
The law could, however, have declined to intervene by statute and forced parties to contract for
protections for creditors should a debtor become insolvent. If bankruptcy law were not mandatory,
creditors would prefer private debt collection remedies that would result in a ‘“run” on the debtor’s
assets’. 80 Because later creditors are unwilling to give up private debt collection even though a coordinated process will maximise value, the law intervenes to maximise the value of the debtor’s assets.
The unwillingness of creditors to include a co-ordination clause arises because of a ‘time inconsistency
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problem induced by the sequential nature of a debtor’s contracts with creditors’. 81 If there are earlier
and later lenders to a single borrower, the later lender can offer terms agreeing not to co-ordinate with
other lenders; that offer comes with a lower interest rate for the borrower that both the later lender
and the borrower prefer. 82 Absent a law mandating co-ordination, creditors will be inclined to ‘get in
line today (by example, getting a sheriff to execute on the debtor’s equipment)’. 83 That may be worse
for creditors as a whole because holding onto the assets will maximise value. 84 The ad hoc liquidation
that occurs when there is no bankruptcy statute results in deadweight loss 85 leading to worse results
than would occur with legislatively mandated co-ordination.
Bankruptcy law solves a problem that creditors do not want to resolve by contract. The time
sequence problem hinders parties from reaching efficient results. The earlier lenders have terms already
and will not be able to contract with later lenders because they do not yet exist. The later lenders and
borrowers borrowing from such lenders will likely refuse co-ordination clauses. Had the lending all
occurred at the same time with all lenders and borrowers acting together, parties might be incentivised
to include co-ordination clauses which would maximise value for all creditors when viewed ex ante.
Because private contractors won’t solve the problem, a judicial response arising out of the common law
of contracts implying terms in creditor–borrower contracts would be hard to justify under traditional
models of majoritarian preferences. Statutes, through the addition of the bankruptcy statute as a term
in all contracts, can overcome private parties’ disinclination to adopt efficient co-ordination clauses
caused by a time inconsistency problem – a type of bargaining obstacle – and benefit welfare through
preventing runs on assets which outweigh costs. 86
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Common law courts’ interpretation of bankruptcy statutes has also interestingly yielded unintended
consequences when courts depart from the common methodology described in this chapter. One example is in the
Chrysler bankruptcy. See MJ Roe and D Skeel, ‘Assessing the Chrysler Bankruptcy’ (2010) 108 Michigan Law Review
727. Roe and Skeel argue that the Chrysler bankruptcy was presented as a § 363 sale but operated more as a §
1129 reorganisation (ibid 741). Secured creditors received only 29 cents for every dollar of debt they held, whereas
unsecured ‘retiree claims were promised well over 50 cents on the dollar’ (ibid 733). The bankruptcy court
departed from bankruptcy norms (ibid 742–49), and the court’s failure to consider this chapter’s common
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VII. Statutes or Common Law Rules to Facilitate Contracting Save
Parties’ Transaction Costs, Overcome Bargaining Obstacles and
Develop an Efficient Governance Form
A. Facilitating Contracts through 2-206 and Constructive Conditions of Exchange
Statutes also have another function of facilitating contracting by providing off-the-shelf default rules to
parties’ contracts that parties can use to minimise transaction costs or opt out of if they have
idiosyncratic preferences that run contrary to the default rules. 87 Statutes providing such default rules
lower the costs of parties who have majoritarian preferences. 88 Article 2 of the UCC provides many such
default rules. 89
When parties contract, they encounter barriers of various kinds, including bounded rationality,
opportunism and uncertainty. 90 When such barriers to express contractual solutions exist, courts or
legislatures might intervene in the parties’ contractual arrangement by supplying terms or default rules,
but only if the benefits of the default rules are greater than any offsetting costs. 91 The existence of
barriers to parties reaching a private agreement justifies interventions – either through the common law
or legislature – to supply default rules or implied terms to help the parties achieve their goals. Were it
not for those transaction costs, the parties would have adopted those terms on their own. 92
Section 2-206 of the UCC exemplifies a statutory default rule governing contract formation than
can be justified as welfare maximising. Rather than add a term to a contract, 2-206 instead provides a
default rule to judge contract formation. Unless the parties unambiguously indicate that a particular
mode or manner of acceptance is required, an offer can be accepted in ‘any manner and by any medium

But see O Ben-Shahar and JAE Pottow, ‘On the Stickiness of Default Rules’ (2005) 33 Florida State University Law
Review 651, 651–53 (arguing that ‘parties might choose not to opt out of a legal default even when a better
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reasonable in the circumstances’. 93 This rule rests on the idea that because most offerors are indifferent
to the manner and mode of acceptance, the default rule should mirror that preference – lowering costs
for most offerors. The law will not require sellers (acceptors) to accept by an answer in words unless the
buyer (offeror) mandates such action. This lowers transaction costs by eliminating unnecessary and
overly formal requirements of contract formation.
The 2-206 default rule also lowers another cost of transacting: the risk of opportunism by
sellers. Without the statute, the following scenario could occur. A seller could ship non-conforming
goods. If one construes the contract as calling for ‘the act’ of shipment of conforming goods, then the
seller could escape liability for breach of contract by claiming that the unilateral act that the buyer
demanded – a shipment of conforming goods – had failed to occur. 94 Therefore, a contract would not
exist and the seller could opportunistically immunise itself from a breach of contract lawsuit. 95 Section
2-206 thus prevents the seller from seizing on a formal technicality to escape liability for contract
breach. 96
The UCC prompted changes from the Restatement (First) to the Restatement (Second) of
Contracts on the manner and mode of acceptance, suggesting that the common law was influenced by a
statutory initiative to provide a comparable solution to opportunism and transaction cost problems of
overly formal acceptance protocols. 97 The Restatement (First), in s 31, reflected the traditional view that
offerors cared deeply about the manner and mode of acceptance 98 and assumed that offerors would
craft their contract to request either an act or a return promise. If the offer was ambiguous, s 31
presumed that a bilateral contract was intended, and that offerors intend to permit only one type of
acceptance.
The Restatement (Second) of Contracts, adopted in 1981, followed 2-206 by enacting s 30.
Instead of a preference in favour of a bilateral contract, s 30(2) provides: ‘Unless otherwise
unambiguously indicated by the language or the circumstances, an offer invites acceptance in any
manner and by any medium reasonable in the circumstances.’ 99
This sequence demonstrates how a statute may affect the course of the common law by
eliminating a common law rule that added to parties’ transaction costs. 100 The traditional rule, later
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The common methodology described in this chapter also informs analysis of whether a statute that eliminated
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rejected by the Restatement (Second), seemed at odds with the parties’ likely indifference to the
manner and mode of acceptance.
Another example of a default rule which arises not through statute but through the common
law and shares the common methodology is the doctrine of constructive conditions of exchange. Until
Lord Mansfield, unless a party had expressly conditioned its own performance on the performance of
the other party, the law refused to imply such a term. 101 Under the prior common law rule of mutual
and independent covenants, when parties entered a bilateral executory contract, they faced the risk
that they would have to go forward with their own performance without the other party being required
to perform. 102 Parties face uncertainty about the other party’s opportunism potential and the risk of
investing sunk costs that will be lost if the other party does not perform. 103 Because the risk is the same
throughout all transactions, a court can intervene with an implied term, a constructive condition of
exchange, that makes one party’s duty to perform conditional on the other party performing. This
minimises costs more than requiring every party to provide for such a contingency, and would be widely
accepted by those subject to the rule. The other options of screening one’s counterparty for
opportunistic potential or bonding devices might be more costly than the law-supplied rule. The law can
minimise transaction costs, prevent opportunism, and prevent one party from having to finance the
other’s performance by implying default rules that accord with the parties’ intentions and prevent
unexpected losses. The shared methodology of intervening when costs of intervention are outweighed
by benefits thus explains implying a constructive condition of exchange into parties’ private contracts.

B. Facilitating Contracts through Corporate Statutes and Common Law
Corporate statutes or common law courts provide or decline to add terms to supplement contracts in
the same manner as art 2, 104 and in a manner that reflects a common methodology. They provide
default terms to private parties’ contracts that those furnishing resources to corporations receive in
exchange for their contribution. One such term entitles the furnisher of resources with a claim against
207’ (1982) 68 Virginia Law Review 1217. UCC § 2-207 reversed the common-law rule, providing that an expression
of acceptance that states additional or different terms can still operate as an acceptance. UCC § 2-207 (1). If both
parties’ conduct recognises the existence of a contract for sale, such contract is established even if the writings do
not ‘establish a contract’ – any divergent terms are replaced with UCC gap-fillers. UCC § 2-207(3). Though 2-207
was implemented to reduce transaction costs and curb opportunism, some critics have argued that the result has
been inefficient – UCC-supplied terms may be ‘poorly suited to the transaction’: Douglas and Weisberg (ibid) 1223.
Moreover, drafters may desire to intentionally form incomplete contracts. Sanga (n 24). Then again, the
inefficiency of gap-filler terms may be overstated in an economy where few participants read all fine print of
written contracts, which reduces the incentive to provide tailored, efficient terms.
See EW Patterson, ‘Constructive Conditions in Contracts’ (1943) 42 Columbia Law Review 903, 907–10 (cited in
I Ayres and G Klass, Studies in Contract Law, 9th edn (St Paul, West Publishing, 2017) 843.
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the firm. 105 Corporate statutes govern the control 106 and distribution 107 for the investor and those
statutory provisions automatically become part of the investor’s contract. The equity investor, a
common stockholder, and the residual claimant on the assets of the firm benefit from contract terms
supplied by statute. In addition, the common stockholder enters into other side agreements (contracts)
including the articles of incorporation and bylaws. These contracts often provide for governance terms
and the stock price of the investment share contract is affected by the market’s perception of these
governance provisions. 108
The enabling statutes create default rules for equity investors’ contracts. But should there be a
collective intervention – either by statute or by common law – that supplies a performance obligation to
supplement the terms of the equity investor’s contract? 109 When the law supplements the parties’
investor contract by supplying a performance obligation or fiduciary duty, the justification rests on a
determination of whether there were obstacles to the parties’ reaching an express agreement on their
own to control a problem. Absent such bargaining obstacles, the parties could reach a completely
contingent contract to control problems, such as agency costs, and that contract would be selfenforcing. 110
The problem that the equity investor faces when delegating discretion to an agent is the ‘natural
phenomenon of what might be termed the performer’s propensity to diverge caused by different
preferences ...’. 111 Agent shirking is an agency cost to the principal. Because of bounded rationality, 112
the parties may have difficulty foreseeing the myriad of ways in which an agent will act
opportunistically. The law intervenes by supplying an implied fiduciary obligation to supplement the
investor’s contract when it determines that the law-supplied fiduciary obligation will achieve a reduction
in agency costs at a lesser cost than the private strategies that the parties could undertake on their own.
Fiduciary duty protects investors who have only a residual claim on the assets of the firm. The
decision to protect such investors with a mandatory fiduciary duty that prevents parties from
105
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contracting out of the duty of loyalty 113 – one of the prongs of fiduciary duty 114 – stems from a belief
that the costs of controlling the ‘propensity to diverge’ through private strategies 115 are too high
because the principal cannot see all of the alternative decisions that the agent will make. 116 Other
private devices to control agency costs include adjusting the compensation of the agent or investigating
and providing incentives for good performance. Both mechanisms are costly or infeasible because the
agent will not work for a knocked-down wage 117 and investigation of incentive schemes may be difficult
when the agent’s actions are unobservable. The law, following the common methodology, supplies a
term – fiduciary duty – as the least costly alternative to solving non-contractible agency costs.
Further, the institutional choice of whether to supply the default rule to solve a non-contractible
problem of agency costs by statute or by a common law rule on fiduciary duty that intervenes in the
contract may be influenced by whether there is deep expertise in the judiciary. 118 If so, and given path
dependence of already existing case law, the common law solution may be most cost-effective. A
J Velasco, ‘How Many Fiduciary Duties are There in Corporate Law’ (2010) 83 Southern California Law Review
1231.
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statutory bright line rule, however, may create unintended costs. For example, ‘[the Model Business
Corporation Act]’s Herculean attempt to create a comprehensive bright line rule approach to directorconflict transactions ... breaks down in practice and requires the use of judicial discretion in reviewing
conflict transactions’. 119

C. Declining to Intervene
Cost minimisation and the common methodology of intervening only when the benefits outweigh the
costs also explains legislative and common law refusals to intervene. Article 2 adopts a penalty default
approach to a missing quantity term in a sale of goods contract. If the parties have not specified a
quantity term in the contract, the UCC refuses to supply one. 120 This refusal incentivises parties to
include the quantity term themselves or risk non-enforcement of the contract. 121 The legislature, in the
UCC, refuses to intervene because arriving at a quantity ex post by a court would be too costly 122 and
the costs will be lower if the parties agree on the quantity term ex ante. 123 The difference in prospective
costs justifies the legislature’s refusal to intervene.
The cost explanation for the refusal to supply a quantity term finds further support if one
considers how the law treats a missing quantity term in the context of long-term requirements
contracts. There, the law intervenes with an implied term of good faith to determine the quantity. 124
The divergent approach in that context is consistent with the common methodology of intervening only
if doing so increases net benefits for the parties to the exchange. If a penalty default information forcing
rationale theory is subscribed to, then the court should arguably refuse to intervene and force the
parties to supply the quantity even in long-term contracts.
When, however, parties face obstacles to specifying a quantity because of bounded rationality,
which limits the ability to predict the quantity in a long-term contract, the law intervenes. It measures
the quantity by the party with the discretion to specify a quantity, such as a buyer in a requirements
contract, by an amount that may be demanded in good faith. 125 When, however, the parties face low
obstacles to achieving a completely contingent contract, as in a discrete transaction, the court refuses to
supply a quantity term.
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The information-disclosing penalty default rationale that explains 2-201 does not make sense
when bounded rationality prevents parties from determining the quantity. In such cases, when the
‘parties can operate only in a second-best world’ 126 beset by bounded rationality, when problems of
opportunism might arise over a long-term contract, and when costs of devising express constraints are
high, the law, through a statute such as 2-306 and the courts through case law, 127 imply a term of good
faith to constrain the announced quantity. In such cases the cost-minimising solution would be the
implied term of good faith, so under the common methodology the law intervenes.
When the debate about missing quantity terms is situated in the context of barriers to
bargaining that exist in different degrees in discrete and long-term requirements contracts with a
comparison of alternative solutions to determine which offers the greatest net benefits under a
remediableness analysis, 128 a structured approach based on the common methodology of assessing
barriers to bargaining and a net benefit improvement approach to gap-filling emerges as the one that
underlies judicial and statutory interventions.
In other situations, the common law will decline to intervene in parties’ contracts with a
fiduciary duty. The law generally refuses to intervene in a preferred stockholder’s investment contract
and such decisions rest on the structure – the common methodology – articulated earlier: will the
addition of a term to the contract minimise cost while maximising value? If implication of a term for one
party – the preferred stockholders – would result in a hit to the other claimants (common stockholders)
who made their investments based on risks and priced them based on a lack of fiduciary protections,
rearranging those risks would be destabilising. 129 Moreover, courts should not add implied protections
when the claimants, such as preferred stockholders, can easily employ a variety of other private
strategies to protect themselves. In the case of venture capitalists holding preferred stock, their
strategies include staged financing 130 and board control, 131 making extra-contractual protections
superfluous and costly.
A comparative cost–benefit analysis underlies decisions on whether courts should intervene to
grant preferred stockholders implied protections not contracted for. The law declines to imply a
fiduciary duty to protect preferred stockholders. In such cases the intervener implicitly uses the
common methodology to decide that certain parties belong to ‘classes of cases where the transactors
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are able to employ private strategies that control the performer’s propensity to diverge’. 132 There would
be no reason to intervene, especially when there are offsetting contracting around costs that might
follow the intervention.
When preferred stockholders ask for additional rights or protections not included in their
contracts, courts also must wrestle with whether and why to grant such protections and use a
framework that assesses whether the preferred stockholders could protect themselves and whether
adding implied protections would result in an overall net benefit. 133 Preferred stockholders incorporate
rights, limitations and preferences in the articles or charter of the issuer. 134 A typical statute, such as
that operating in Delaware, makes the legislative statement that special rights, limitations and
preferences must be in the articles to be effective. 135 The statute thus begins the process of enabling
other contracts that follow, including the articles or charter. These contracts or add-ons follow and
include bylaws or regulations. 136 Shareholder agreements or stock purchase agreements – additional
contracts – may have expanded terms that are extracted by the original purchasers. 137
Once those rights, preferences and limitations are stated, the question arises as to whether the
common law courts, or another intervenor, should intervene and afford preferred stockholders special
fiduciary protections beyond those afforded all common stockholders that were not explicitly in their
bargained-for contract. 138
When deciding whether to imply such protections, common law courts must situate the
question of implying a term into an overall context of bargained-for exchange and the principal/agent
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context. 139 An adjudicator must address the problem that parties face when there is a delegation issue
due to the separation of ownership and control. 140 Preferred stockholders face agency costs and the
danger of opportunism when they furnish resources to an agent. Will implying a fiduciary duty maximise
welfare by constraining opportunism and controlling moral hazard? When there are multiple claimants
or investors, including preferred and common stockholders, what is the agent’s duty? Presumably the
agent is ‘tasked with honoring the claims of the different types of investors’. 141 The agent must assume
the task of operating the firm and administering the claims possessed by the capital furnishers, including
the preferred. The agent may take steps that might adversely affect one set of claimants, such as the
preferred, even though there is no effect on the overall asset pool of the firm. 142
In deciding if the preferred need protection supplied by a common law fiduciary duty, the courts
could adopt an ‘all or nothing approach’ and deny any fiduciary protection beyond that owed to all
common stockholders not to waste assets or it could extend fiduciary protection to all preferred
stockholders. 143 In general, the courts deny added implied fiduciary protections to preferred
stockholders. When the preferred can negotiate for contractual protection, as in the venture capital
context, adding a term would bestow a gift to the preferred they did not bargain for and upset the basic
risk/return profile of their investment, a cost that mitigates against adoption. Adding the term would
also cause a ‘hit’ in terms of reduced value to other claimants such as common stockholders.
However, when substantial barriers to negotiating protections exist, as when preferred stock is
issued when the holders have no direct bargaining power and the preferred are subsequent purchasers
trading on relatively inefficient markets where pricing signals are attenuated, 144 and there is no
underwriter helping the preferred, there may be reason for a common law court to imply fiduciary
protection, at least when the market price does not correctly value weaknesses in the protections that
the preferred has under its contracts with the firm. 145

VIII. Mandatory Disclosure in Securities, Real Estate and Consumer
Contexts: What Works?
The three examples discussed below demonstrate that legislative strategies of intervention that add
terms to contracts through mandated disclosure depend first on a decision that parties’ private
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strategies or common law solutions may not work to effectively control a problem, thereby laying the
groundwork for intervention. The disparate success of disclosure laws, with real-estate disclosure and
securities laws working more effectively than consumer disclosure laws, 146 underlines how important
the comparative cost–benefit analysis is. If consumer laws add costs without enhancing consumer
decision-making, then the legislature should consider other strategies that are more effective and find
less costly legislative solutions.

A. Securities
In the context of contracts for the sale of securities, the legislature’s decision of whether to intervene to
mandate disclosure depends on whether such disclosure will not otherwise occur. By intervening to
require disclosure and to forbid any material misstatements, the law can control an agency problem that
would otherwise be uncontrolled. The law constantly assesses whether the benefits of intervention
outweigh the costs. The benefits of the Exchange Act of 1934 disclosures are thought to outweigh the
costs because the disclosures promote accurate pricing of securities, fostering allocative efficiency. 147
When investors buy stocks and enter into contracts as equity investors, questions will arise as to
whether managers in the firm will make all the material information available to the investors or
whether a collective intervention to force the disclosure of information is needed either in the form of a
common law rule or a statute.
The management and the shareholders have a conflict of interest – an agency cost that will
sometimes cause the manager to act opportunistically at the expense of shareholders. If shareholders
fear the non-disclosure of material information, the manager will be ‘the primary loser’. 148 To convince
prospective shareholders that all relevant information is being disclosed, management may try to signal
that disclosures are accurate using auditors. 149 Management may also invest in stock options, signaling
that the information has been disclosed. The manager could suffer losses if it bought stock at a high
price that did not reflect negative material information. The manager’s own investment is a selfregulating device against material non-disclosures to investors. This illustrates how voluntary disclosure
may occur without legal intervention.
Moreover, if managers of companies or promoters acquiring new businesses and selling their
services to investors all must compete for investments, and investors are rational, self-interested
But see CR Korsmo, ‘The Audience for Corporate Disclosure’ (2006) 102 Iowa Law Review 1581, 1632
(suggesting current inefficiencies in the approach of securities laws and arguing that securities disclosures should
be narrowly tailored to ‘minimize the costs sophisticated investors face’).
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failures to disclose will have negative consequences and result in losses for managers and promoters
because rational investors will invest elsewhere. 150 Thus, such managers will be incentivised to
voluntarily disclose information to investors or will face the possibility of losing investors.
Another means of equalising information between buyers and sellers of securities is for the
buyers to contract for disclosure. However, significant bargaining obstacles may hinder such contractual
agreements including the lack of equal bargaining power, lack of expertise and lack of sophistication.
Buyers will not know what questions to ask to secure disclosure, and when buyers do ask, sellers will
selectively contract with buyers to whom there is no duty to disclose a strategy which keeps the
information hidden. 151 The same obstacles that prevent a buyer from formulating the right questions to
ask may also render common law fraud actions ineffective. Without the questions being asked, holding
the seller accountable for misleading answers may be difficult under common law fraud. Moreover,
rescission as a remedy in common law fraud actions may be an ineffective institutional response.
Because obstacles to self-induced disclosure exist, 152 the law intervenes through statute by
requiring disclosure of information to investors both through the initial registration statement and
though subsequent regular periodic filings. The intervener – the legislature – implements a law affecting
a private contract/sale between a broker and a buyer if intervention in the form of mandated disclosure
is justified using a net-benefit or welfare-improvement methodology. Disclosure can avoid the
inefficiencies that would occur if investors tried to self-protect by gathering the information on their
own. 153 The disclosure of the information affects the pricing of the underlying securities and contractual
behaviour. Investors enter contracts with their broker on the basis of information about a company
released in a report or prospectus. The investor ‘can effectively free ride on the accurate pricing
generated by the buying and selling of sophisticated investors’. 154
The Exchange Act of 1934 requires disclosure on an ongoing basis of information about the
dealings between the management and the company. 155 Why would federal law require such
disclosure? One answer, consistent with the thesis in this chapter, is that requiring disclosure
economises on transaction costs that investors would otherwise face in controlling agency costs. 156
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Investors face an agency cost when they buy stock because often the promotor or the manager may
have purchased property or other businesses and may therefore have conflicting interests. The
securities laws force the disclosure of such self-interested dealings.
Mandatory disclosure may therefore be justified in efficiency terms. It may be more costeffective to mandate disclosure of a uniform variety than to have all promoters or managers negotiate
individually for disclosure ‘where the outcome is not likely to vary among firms and thus the costs of
complying with a one size fits all rule are less than the costs of negotiating individual levels of
disclosure’. 157 Because investors would want managers to disclose information on matters such as
conflicts of interest as a means of controlling agency costs, and managers would be willing to disclose as
a way of encouraging transactions and overcoming investors’ disinclination to invest without such
disclosure, the mandatory rule is efficient. Both investors and managers would want disclosure of such
information and a one-size-fits-all rule lowers the cost of controlling the agency problem. 158

B. Real Estate Disclosure
Mandated seller disclosure laws in real-estate transactions offer another instance when statutes
intervene in private contracts and displace common law rules. Seller disclosure laws help to clarify the
seller’s obligations. Under the common law, those obligations remained unclear as courts struggled with
differentiating between patent and latent defects.
The question is whether voluntary disclosure obligations under the common law would be
effective in solving a problem of asymmetry of information between buyers and sellers and, if not,
would mandated statutory disclosures solve that problem more effectively. If so, then intervention
would yield overall net benefits and maximise welfare.
Prior to 1984, many states followed the doctrine of caveat emptor in real-estate transactions.
Ohio is illustrative, and precluded a purchaser’s recovery for a structural defect when the defect was
discoverable, the buyer had the opportunity to examine the premises and the seller did not engage in
fraud. 159 Courts presumed that the ‘duty falls upon the purchaser to make inquiry and examination’. 160
This approach effectively precluded rescission for patent defects unless the seller was guilty of common
law fraud, such as concealment.
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In 1984, the California Supreme Court set forth the principles for a seller’s duty to disclose red
flags in contracts for the sale of residential real-estate property. 161 By the early 2000s, a majority of
states mandated seller disclosure, often in the form of a statute. 162
The asymmetry-of-information problem explains why states adopted statutes. Absent disclosure
statutes, the seller will often fail to disclose information to the buyer. Sellers with high-quality real
estate will then withdraw from the market. 163 Subsequently, buyers will assign only an average price for
the real estate and sellers will not be able to charge a premium for higher-quality real estate. 164 This
process continues, resulting in what economists called the ‘lemons’ problem. 165
If mandatory seller disclosure laws can solve this ‘lemons’ problem, sellers can release higherquality properties to the market and receive a higher price. As one author studying the effect of these
laws predicted: ‘housing prices should rise’. 166 Empirical data confirms such a rise in prices following the
adoption of seller disclosure statutes and a lowered risk premium for real estate. Mandated disclosure
laws permit buyers to identify higher-quality real estate and allow sellers to realise the full value of such
property.
The success of such disclosure statutes in solving asymmetries of information and the ‘lemons’
problem more effectively than the common law may be explained, in part, by a phenomenon in which
people cheat less when forced to sign a form pledging not to cheat (as on an exam). 167 Although
cheaters are omnipresent in society, and although some people will always cheat, others ‘want to be
honest’ and when furnished with an ethical reminder that requires their pledge, will cheat less. 168
Having the seller sign a form that mandates disclosure of information may reduce the tendency to
withhold information in a way that was not present under the common law rules, which only prohibited
fraud when there was uncertainty about what was material and what was a patent or latent defect in
the premises. Statutory interventions in sale contracts increased wealth and offered a comparative
advantage over the common law in solving the ‘lemons’ problem, thereby justifying intervention under
the shared methodology.
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C. Consumer Disclosure
The rise of standardised contracts has prompted legislative intervention for more disclosure.
Legislatures and courts have intervened in consumer contracts by mandating the disclosure of certain
terms 169 and by regulating the process by which the terms of the contract are disclosed. In certain
instances, the seller must make the term conspicuous to a buyer. 170 Other disclosure laws require
insurers to disclose that buyers can buy different types of insurance without bundling the insurance in a
single policy. 171
The goals of legislative intervention included increased consumer awareness of the terms of a
contract by making them more accessible and less hidden. At the same time, the legislature hoped that
such disclosure would increase competition among providers or sellers 172 and improve decision-making
by consumers. 173
Lawmakers find disclosure an appealing method of regulating contracts because it avoids direct
legislative regulation or modification of a contract’s terms – thereby preserving autonomy for the
parties. Yet, the failures of mandated disclosure as a method of improving decision-making underline
the importance of using the common methodology for assessing whether the net benefits of additional
disclosure legislation outweigh the costs of such intervention. An assessment should include the efficacy
of the mandated disclosure and the negative ‘unintended consequences’ of such disclosure, 174 and
other harms.
The success of disclosure mandates depends on parties actually reading, analysing, and
understanding the disclosed terms. Recent empirical studies of licence agreements show that despite
See WC Whitford, ‘The Functions of Disclosure Regulation in Consumer Transactions’ [1973] Wisconsin Law
Review 400. Disclosure of terms today include overdraft fees on ATM withdrawals, 12 CFR § 1030.11(a)(1)(i)
(2019), and APR under the Truth in Lending Act, ibid § 1026.60 (b)(1).
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the disclosure requirements and increased accessibility of contract terms, parties fail to read the
contracts. 175 That failure initially made common-law solutions ineffective as many common-law
doctrines are premised on parties having a duty to read. Today, the difficulties that the common law
faces in solving assent in standardised contracts is reflected in the failure of courts to utilise s 211 of the
Restatement (Second) of Contracts. 176
Yet, disclosure by statutory mandates also results in overload and accumulation problems that
interfere with the ability of disclosees to ‘understand, assimilate and analyse the avalanche of
information’. 177 The mountain of information also results in fewer consumers reading contracts. As
disclosures increase and disclosees face an accumulation of disclosures, consumers are less inclined to
read the disclosures. 178
Moreover, problems such as illiteracy, innumeracy and a lack of comprehensibility persist,
which, when coupled with a failure to read, render the required disclosures meaningless. In some
instances, the benefits may be slight compared to the burdens. Even if the disclosures would improve
decision-making, those subject to the mandates often devise strategies to undermine the effectiveness
of the disclosures. One such strategy is to ‘bury the lede’ and highlight other unimportant provisions. 179
When legislatures intervene to achieve broad social goals (that differ from the parties’ private
goals) and to improve private decisions, the decision-maker must still consider whether there are other
costs on future contracting parties that would more than offset the benefits obtained by the statutory
intervention. The failures with mandated disclosure and the ever-cascading disclosures of more
information 180 underline the importance of devising legislative strategies that account for how those
subject to the laws will react (including both the disclosers and the disclosees). To achieve legislative
goals of fostering better decision-making by consumers, legislators may need to adopt targeted
strategies demonstrated to be effective. These could include requiring disclosers to use pretested
language that consumers understand, rely on alternative strategies that forbid certain terms (balloon
payments) if consumers will not react to mere disclosures, or nudge consumers to better outcomes by
devising default rules (opting out of savings for a 401k). Another approach is embedded in the Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau regulation of home mortgage contracts. The goal is to adopt ‘newly
simplified mortgage disclosures ... tested in labs for readability and efficacy’. 181
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To address the failure of disclosure informational strategies to achieve readership, two authors
have suggested a new approach to consumer protection laws tailored to the problem that arises when
consumers have an overly optimistic understanding of terms in the contract that does not match the
reality of the meaning of the terms.
The approach championed by Ayres and Schwartz diverges from efforts to improve the
readability and intelligibility of the content of all terms, seeking instead to ascertain through testing
whether ‘consumers held accurate beliefs about the terms’. 182 If so, the terms could be buried in the
contract because, in those cases, the consumers would expect those terms even if they had not read
them. Where, however, the consumer’s expectation about a term relied on by one party is more
optimistic than the reality, special precautions would need to be taken – warning boxes – to highlight
such terms. Without such boxes, the terms would not be enforceable. 183 The advantage of the Ayres
and Schwartz approach is that it would limit ‘consumers’ scarce attention’ 184 to terms that consumers
falsely understand to be more protective than the reality. 185 Disclosure would focus on terms likely to
surprise the consumer, and would save on the costly and often pyrrhic approach of mandating
readability and conspicuousness when most consumers simply do not read contracts even when they
are accessible through legislative or judicial mandates. Their approach would be consistent with the
shared methodology suggested earlier – opting for an intervention when costs and burdens do not
outweigh the benefits of enhancing decision-making and overall welfare.

IX. Terms Forbidden by Legislature: Regulatory Intervention and its
Limits
Sometimes the legislature takes a different interventional stance. Instead of trying to facilitate
contracting by providing off-the-shelf default rules or gap-fillers when barriers to bargaining prevent the
parties from reaching an optimal agreement, the legislature sometimes chooses to forbid the parties
from enacting a term in their contract – or provides that if such a term is included, the law will withhold
enforcement. These statutory interventions require a different analytical framework for justifying
interventions than when law intervenes to facilitate bargains.
Legislatures regulate contracts by passing laws that modify or limit the private contractual
choices parties can make. For example, the law might forbid the parties from entering into contracts
that contain covenants not to compete. 186 When the legislature intervenes in this manner, it withholds
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enforcement of private contracts to achieve certain broad social objectives, or to conform to social
norms, even though the parties themselves benefited from the contract.
Examining how private parties respond to one particular statutory intervention can facilitate an
understanding of the reverberative effects of statutory interventions in private contracting and the need
to account for such effects whenever there is an intervention in order to determine if intervention will
lead to welfare improvement.
California’s statutory prohibition of covenants not to compete provides one example. 187 Such
covenants are ‘ubiquitous’ in employment contracts, 188 both for high-level management employees
and, more recently, for lower-level non-managerial employees. 189
Prohibiting covenants not to compete raises the question of when and why such intervention is
required. How does the intervention affect the achievement of the employer’s goals in including such
covenants, such as the deterrence of poaching valuable employees? Further, how can firms be
incentivised to invest in training for employees given the potential for poaching if such covenants are
not enforced? 190
When jurisdictions forbid such clauses, do parties devise ways to circumvent the legislative
prohibitions in unexpected ways, drawing on informal relational enforcement of otherwise
unenforceable clauses? If so, what does this reveal about the limits of legislative interventions in private
contracts and the need to account for private bargaining when statutes affect such contracts?
Legislatures that sanction non-compete clauses are acting to serve broad public goals,
responding to concerns that without the protection of a non-compete, employers who invest in
employee training will be victimised by other employers hiring away those highly trained employees.
Empirical data show that jurisdictions that enforce such clauses ‘increase … firm-sponsored training for
primarily high skill and high earnings occupations’. 191 A firm’s willingness to invest in training and
protection against post-firm employment are linked. The enforcement of covenants not to compete also
affects worker mobility, with enforcement of such covenants reducing worker mobility and the non-
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enforcement of such clauses increasing mobility and promoting innovation. 192 Variation in enforcement
may also affect hiring with reduced enforcement of such clauses leading to a decreased willingness to
hire employees without experience. This follows logically because, without the protection of the noncompete, firms may decrease training investment and rely instead on other firms to train employees. 193
The enforcement of non-competes may have positive effects on wages, at least among physicians. 194
To determine whether the legislature should deny enforcement of such clauses by modulating
enforcement according to the level of managerial expertise, or by operating under the common law to
enforce to such clauses as long as they are reasonable, the effects – both positive and negative – on
worker mobility, wages and hiring are all relevant. California’s decision to adopt a bright line prohibition
on covenants not to compete demonstrates a legislative determination that the benefits of a strict
statutory rule outweigh the costs of a common law rule assessing the reasonableness of the restriction.
However, the presence of the statutory ban on covenants not to compete only blocks public
enforcement of such covenants. Denying public enforcement cannot suppress efficient bargaining
between parties. If there is an efficient exchange, barring one form of exchange, such as a contract with
a covenant not to compete, it will not prevent parties from reaching their goals in a cost-effective
manner that protects the employer and the employee.
Such bargaining has been ignored when legislatures absolutely prohibit non-compete covenants.
Parties faced with such a prohibition appear to deliberately enter into unenforceable contracts. These
contracts contain both covenants not to compete and post-employment severance payments to be
furnished in installments – with both the non-compete and the installments being legally
unenforceable. 195 The employer is incentivised to make the severance payments as long as the
employee refrains from competing. Similarly, the employee will refrain from competing in order to
secure the unenforceable severance payment. In effect, the parties informally enforce a contract
covenant that is unenforceable by statute.
Thus, one cost of the California intervention is that many parties contract around the prohibition
and rely on informal enforcement of unenforceable contracts. 196 This cost needs to be weighed against
the benefits of the statute. It is possible that the private informal arrangements that parties enter into
may be a less costly result than public enforcement of a covenant not to compete. The parties institute a
relationship built on trust in which each monitors the performance of the other. The statute banning
covenants works in tandem with informal private arrangements to achieve the goals of the common law
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in balancing the interests of the employer in preserving an incentive to invest with the employee’s
interest in worker mobility.
The non-compete example demonstrates the importance of understanding bargained-for
exchange in evaluating statutory and common law interventions outlawing certain contracts. That
bargained-for exchange model demonstrates that parties will find a way to achieve their private goals
even when public statutory law blocks one way of achieving those goals; efficient bargaining cannot be
suppressed.
The question should be whether the reverberative effects of the statute are more costly and
whether they exceed the welfare benefits from adoption of the statute. Those benefits could be
considered in the narrow social sense looking only at the two contracting parties or more broadly.
Legislative prohibition can take a different form of blocking an exchange when the legislature
outlaws a certain type of transaction. Such prohibitions may cause unintended costs and demonstrate
the limits of legislation that contravenes parties’ private preferences. One such prohibition is contained
in the Sarbanes-Oxley (‘SOX’) legislation. 197 Responding to Enron abuses, s 402 outlawed loans to
executives. 198 Prior to SOX, companies could, for example, lend money to an executive to buy a house.
One problem with the SOX prohibition is that ‘because if one form of compensation is restricted,
managers can renegotiate their contracts to make up for the loss’. 199 The legislation has had limited
effect and may have led to more inefficient compensation arrangements. 200 After SOX, instead of
loaning money to executives, the company will simply give the executive a one-time bonus. The
company will swallow the cost to recruit the executive and the company will not be reimbursed as it
would have under a conventional loan. The prohibition on loans may also have the undesirable effect of
prohibiting loans to facilitate stock purchases, thereby depriving companies of a key mechanism for
‘aligning managerial incentives with shareholder interests’. 201 Those costs of intervention may outweigh
the benefits. Only by taking the private exchange into account can those costs be factored into the costs
of legislative intervention.
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Although statutes have sometimes been neglected in contract law, it is palpably clear that statutes play
an ever-expanding role in contracts. Traditionally, these statutory adoptions have been regarded as
intrusions into the private world of contract. This chapter argues that to assess the significance of these
statutory developments, one must situate them in the context of bargained-for exchange. When so
situated, legislation, like the common law, is an institution for minimising the costs of exchange.
Legislation shares a common methodology with the common law when it formulates decisions about
whether and how to add terms to contract. Intervention must depend on whether adding terms will
increase welfare. That analysis depends on whether the parties can achieve their goals without any
intervention and whether intervention will reduce the costs of exchange without introducing offsetting
costs that outweigh the benefits. The framework is useful in explaining why and when courts or statutes
intervene to facilitate contracting with rules or implied terms when obstacles prevent parties from
contracting to solve a problem. It also sheds light on when and why courts or legislatures should decline
to intervene, and on when and why disclosure mandated by statutes works or fails. The framework also
illuminates the limits and offsetting costs of statutory intervention when parties devise mechanisms to
circumvent statutes that forbid terms in contracts.
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